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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 
JON DUNN WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT OF 
THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES IN WRITING OR 
CANCELLING PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE COVERAGE 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES COULD RELY ON JON 
DUNN IN CANCELLING PLAINTIFF'S INSURANCE 
COVERAGE WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE TO 
PLAINTIFF AND THAT JON DUNN WAS THE AGENT 
OF PLAINTIFF AND PENCILLE AND NOT AN 
AGENT OF THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES 
III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN. NOT PERMITTING 
THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT 
PRIOR TO TRIAL TO INCLUDE A CLAIM AGAINST 
JON DUNN INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENCE -AND 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Tony Vina, (hereinafter referred to as 
Vina) and Beverly Pencille (hereinafter referred to as 
Pencille), entered into an agreement in 1977 whereby Pencille 
subleased from Vina a business known as Bevie-Lee's Friendly 
Tavern on South State Street in Salt Lake City. (Tr. 56). 
As part of this agreement, Vina was the owner of certain 
equipment including electronic games, pool tables, juke 
boxes, cigarette machines, restaurant equipment, and bar 
equipment on the premises at the Tavern. (Tr. 59). Under 
the terms of this agreement, Pencille was to insure Vina's 
equipment on the premises. (Tr. 58). 
In the Spring of 1979, Third-Party Defendant Jon 
Dunn (hereinafter referred to as Dunn) met with Vina and 
Pencille for the purpose of procuring liability and fire 
insurance for the Tavern. (Tr. 65). At the time, Dunn was a 
licensed insurance agent and broker who worked through an 
independent insurance agency known as the Walter Sondrup 
Insurance Agency. Mr. Dunn subsequently obtained and 
communicated quotes for a special multi-peril insurance 
policy to Pencille and Vina from defendant Transwestern 
General Agency, (hereinafter referred to as Transwestern), 
and was authorized to obtain the insurance coverage. (Tr. 
244-246). A policy of insurance was then issued by 
Transwestern with the insuring company being Defendant 
Jefferson Insurance Company of New York, (hereinafter 
referred to as Jefferson), insuring Beverly Pencille and Tony 
Vina, d/b/a Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern. 
The information supplied by Dunn to Transwestern to 
apply for the issued insurance incorrectly showed that the 
entity to be insured was a partnership between Vina and 
Pencille, although, when the policy was issued by 
Transwestern, it mistakenly showed that Bevie-Leefs Friendly 
Tavern was a corporation. In fact, neither type of entity 
existed between Vina and Pencille. 
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Beverly Pencille, with the knowledge of Tony Vina, 
subsequently contacted Jon Dunn and requested that the limits 
of insurance coverage be reduced. (Tr. 262-263). Later 
still, in November, 1979, Pencille met with Dunn and advised 
him that she was going to either sell the business or close 
the operation upon the expiration of her lease which was to 
have occurred on November 28, 1979, and that she wanted to 
cancel the insurance policy as of that date. On November 15, 
1979, Dunn met with Pencille at Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern 
and had her sign a "Request for Cancellation" form. (Tr. 
267-268). This form was forwarded to Transwestern which 
cancelled the policy of insurance effective November 28, 
1979. Tony Vina did not sign the cancellation form nor did 
he have any knowledge that the insurance had been cancelled. 
Third-Party Defendant Jon Dunn acknowledged that he 
knew Vinafs games and equipment were still on the premises 
and that when the request for cancellation was accepted by 
Transwestern, the games and equipment were left uninsured. 
(Tr. 269-271). 
Beverly Pencille did not close down her business 
and, on December 31, 1979, Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern was 
fire-bombed and the contents, including Vinafs games and 
equipment, suffered extensive fire, smoke and water damage. 
Tony Vina contacted Jon Dunn after the fire and 
requested that he or Transwestern investigate and pay for his 
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losses suffered in the fire. At that time, he was, for the 
first time, notified that the policy had been cancelled and 
that Defendant Jefferson Insurance Company of New York would 
not honor his claim. (Tr. 80-81). 
Plaintiff Vina brought the matter before the 
Insurance Department of the State of Utah which found that 
since no partnership existed, cancellation by one insured 
would not be effective as to the interest of the other 
insured without proper notice. The Commission ordered 
defendants to recognize coverage and pay the claim. 
Defendants thereupon sought to overturn this order. 
Thereafter, Plaintiff Vina initiated this action against 
Defendants Jefferson and Transwestern on February 17, 1982. 
In his Complaint, plaintiff alleged that Jon Dunn was acting 
in his capacity as an agent of Defendant Transwestern which 
was a general agent for Defendant Jefferson. Jefferson 
thereupon, on March 30, 1982, filed a third party claim for 
indemnification against Jon Dunn. 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Plaintiff's 
Complaint on September 3, 1985 which was heard by the Trial 
Court at the commencement of trial on October 1, 1985. The 
proposed amendment was to have added Jon Dunn as a party 
defendant. After argument of counsel, the Court took the 
motion under advisement until the close of the trial. 
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The Court found, at the conclusion of trial, that 
the allegations raised against Third-Party Defendant Dunn in 
the plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint were substantially 
different from those raised against him in the Third-Party 
Complaint of Defendant Jefferson; and, consequently, the 
allegations of the proposed Amended Complaint did not relate 
back to the Third-Party Complaint filed by Jefferson, and 
were therefore time barred under the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated §78-12-25 and 26 (1953, as amended), the statute of 
1imitat ions. 
The Court also found that Jon Dunn was not acting 
as the agent of Defendants Transwestern and Jefferson, but 
was the agent of Plaintiff Tony Vina and of Beverly Pencille 
for the purpose of placing and cancelling the insurance 
coverage. Accordingly, Transwestern and Jefferson were 
entitled to rely on the representations of Dunn respecting 
Vina and Pencille. Therefore, Transwestern and Jefferson 
were entitled, the Court found, to believe agent Dunn in his 
assertion that Pencille had the authority to cancel the 
insurance policy without the consent of Vina, notwithstanding 
that no actual partnership was found to exist. 
The Court then held that the cancellation of 
insurance by Pencille alone was effective November 28, 1979 
and that this policy of insurance did not insure the premises 
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known as Bevie-Lee f s Friendly Tavern for damages sustained on 
December 31, 1979. 
A judgment of "No Cause of Ac t ion" was e n t e r e d 
against the p l a i n t i f f . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
PI a i n t i f f - A p p e 1 1 ant V ina c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e 
" R e l a t i o n - B a c k " d o c t r i n e s h o u l d a p p l y t o T h i r d - P a r t y 
Defendant Dunn and that the Amended Complaint should have 
been al lowed. Furthermore, no t i ce should have been given to 
p l a i n t i f f before an e f f e c t i v e c a n c e l l a t i o n of the insurance 
coverage could occur . F i n a l l y , Jon Dunn was a c t i n g as an 
a g e n t , at a l l t i m e s m a t e r i a l h e r e t o , of the Defendants 
Je f ferson and Transwestern, and h i s neg l igent acts should be 
a t t r i b u t e d to h i s p r i n c i p a l s . 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 
JON DUNN WAS NOT ACTING AS AN AGENT OF 
THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES IN WRITING OR 
CANCELLING PLAINTIFFfS INSURANCE COVERAGE 
At the time the po l i cy in quest ion was issued, the 
Utah Insurance Code provided that : 
Utah Code Annotated § 3 1 - 1 7 - 1 . "Agent" 
and " n o n - r e s i d e n t a g e n t " d e f i n e d . 
"Agent" means any person authorized by an 
insurer and on i t s b e h a l f to s o l i c i t 
a p p l i c a t i o n s f o r i n s u r a n c e or t o 
e f f e c t u a t e and c o u n t e r s i g n i n s u r a n c e 
c o n t r a c t s or t o c o l l e c t premiums on 
insurance so appl ied for or e f f ec tua ted . 
A "non-resident agent" is any such person 
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d o m i c i l e d w i t h o u t t h i s s t a t e and a c t i n g 
as an agent as above defined in the s t a t e 
of h i s domic i l e . 
Jon Dunn t e s t i f i e d t h a t at t h e t i m e of t h i s 
t r a n s a c t i o n he was in f a c t an i n s u r a n c e a g e n t - b r o k e r 
as soc ia ted with the Walter Sundrup Agency, l i censed as such 
by the S t a t e of Utah. (Tr. 238) . He met w i t h Tony Vina and 
B e v e r l y P e n c i l l e at t h e i r reques t and d i s c u s s e d procur ing 
coverage for the Tavern to include personal property coverage 
and l i a b i l i t y coverage. He had Vina and P e n c i l l e a s s i s t him 
in c o m p l e t i n g a q u e s t i o n n a i r e w h i c h was s u b m i t t e d to 
Defendant Transwes tern from whom a quote was - issued. This 
q u o t e was in t u r n r e c i t e d to Vina and P e n c i l l e and an 
agreement for insurance was reached. (Tr. 2 4 8 - 2 4 9 ) . Dunn 
then had Transwestern i ssue a binder. 
At no t ime did Vina or P e n c i l l e have any c o n t a c t 
with e i ther of the defendants. Al l of the ir contact was made 
through Dunn, who he ld h i m s e l f out to them as one who had 
a u t h o r i t y to ac t as an insurance agent in procur ing and 
i s s u i n g p o l i c i e s of i n s u r a n c e . No e v i d e n c e was e v e r 
s u b m i t t e d that e i t h e r Vina or P e n c i l l e had any s p e c i a l 
knowledge of the insurance industry. These were lay people 
d e a l i n g w i t h an insurance agent . At no t ime was there any 
i n d i c a t i o n by Dunn that he was not the agent of the defendant 
insurers , or that he was the agent for Vina. 
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The Trial Court found that in fact Dunn was not 
acting as an agent of the defendant companies in writing or 
cancelling plaintiff's insurance coverage, but was rather the 
agent for the insureds. 
It is true that an agency is normally construed as 
a relationship created by agreement of the parties. Among a 
principal and agent, an agency is created by the same manner 
in which a contract is made, to the extent that the creation 
results from the agreement between the principal and agent 
that such a relationship shall exist. See W11^ i s t o n, 
Contracts (3d.Ed) §274. However, even without the mutual 
consent of the principal and agent, an agency by estoppel may 
be created by implication of law insofar as third persons are 
concerned. Such an agency may be established by the conduct 
of the alleged principal and agent. Hart v. Colorado Real 
Estate Commission, 702 P.2d 763 (Colo., App., 1985), Adkinson 
Corporation v. Amer i can^Bu j,l5LLn& Company, 690 P.2d 341 
(Idaho, 1984). 
In the case of Utah State University Etc. v. Sutro 
and Company, 646 P.2d 715 (Utah, 1982) action was brought on 
behalf of Utah State University against several stock brokers 
to recover losses sustained by the University from a program 
of investments. Certain non-resident brokers alleged that no 
personal jurisdiction was acquired over them. They noted 
that two local Logan banks were authorized to transact all 
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s t o c k t r a n s f e r s and t h a t s i n c e t h e banks h a n d l e d the 
U n i v e r s i t y ' s funds and were d e s i g n a t e d by i t to r e c e i v e the ' 
s tock c e r t i f i c a t e s and pay d r a f t s t h e r e f o r , the banks were 
e x c l u s i v e l y t h e a g e n t of t h e U n i v e r s i t y . The Court 
disagreed, holding: 
It is not necessar i l y always true that j* 
party act ing as an agent in at transact ion 
must be e x c l u s i v e l y the agent of one 
party or the other. When he is requested 
and £££jL£rmj5 du t i e s jj3£ eagh of the 
part i e s , wTth the knowledge and consent 
of bothT he may very wel 1 be cons idered 
as an agent Tor each Tor the part i c u l a r 
1JLLX. * SLSLSL lL£ ££HiiJi£JL IJlJjLi: 2JLj.ilc_I£J*i. • 
I n s o f a r as the Logan banks performed 
d u t i e s for and by d i r e c t i o n of t h e 
defendant b r o k e r s , they were a c t i n g as 
the b r o k e r s 1 a g e n t s . That b e i n g s o , 
t h e r e i s ample j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the 
t r i a l court's holding that they conducted 
subs tant ia l and continuous a c t i v i t i e s in 
t h i s s t a t e s u f f i c i e n t to subject them to 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of i t s court. 646 P.2d. 
at 722 (emphasis added). 
See a l s o F o s t e r v. Blake H e i g h t s C o r p o r a t i o n , 530 P.2d 815 
(Utah, 1974) , and a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n ; 3 Am. Jur. 2d. 
Agency, §234 (1962) . 
It is wrong to assume that as far as Plaintiff Vina 
is concerned Jon Dunn was acting exclusively as the agent for 
plaintiff; especially in light of the special relationship 
Dunn held with the defendants as indicated above. The 
plaintiff had every reason to believe Dunn had authority to 
act on behalf of the defendant insurers. 
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING THAT 
THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES COULD RELY ON JON 
DUNN IN CANCELLING PLAINTIFFS INSURANCE 
COVERAGE WITHOUT GIVING NOTICE TO , 
PLAINTIFF, AND THAT JON DUNN WAS THE 
AGENT OF PLAINTIFF AND PENCILLE AND NOT 
AN AGENT OF THE DEFENDANT COMPANIES 
There was no a c t u a l p a r t n e r s h i p between B e v e r l y 
P e n c i l l e and Tony V i n a , and t h e T r i a l Court so found . 
However, tha t Court conc luded s i n c e i t had found that Jon 
Dunn was the agent for Vina and P e n c i l l e for the purposes of 
p l a c i n g the insurance coverage and c a n c e l l i n g the same, 
Defendants Transwestern and Jef ferson were e n t i t l e d to re ly 
on the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of Dunn, and t h e r e f o r e b e l i e v e that 
P e n c i l l e had the authori ty and power to cancel the po l i cy of 
insurance without further s ignature or n o t i c e to Vina. 
I t i s not d i s p u t e d that the b u s i n e s s known as 
B e v i e - L e e ' s F r i e n d l y T a v e r n was a s o l e p r o p r i e t o r s h i p 
operated by Beverly P e n c i l l e , subleased by P l a i n t i f f Vina to 
P e n c i l l e , nor that Mr. Dunn mistakenly informed Transwestern 
that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Vina and P e n c i l l e ; the e n t i t y 
t o be i n s u r e d , as a p a r t n e r s h i p . T r a n s w e s t e r n a l s o 
s u b s e q u e n t l y and m i s t a k e n l y i s s u e d a p o l i c y of insurance 
showing the insured to be a corporation. 
Jon Dunn acknowledged that he knew P l a i n t i f f Vina's 
games and equipment were s t i l l on the premises and that when 
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the request for c a n c e l l a t i o n was accepted by Transwestern and 
Je f f er son , the games and equipment were l e f t uninsured. 
In the matter before the Insurance Commission, the 
hearing o f f i c e r r e l i e d on Couch on Insurance, 2d §67:118 in 
f i n d i n g that c a n c e l l a t i o n by one insured would not be 
e f f e c t i v e as to the i n t e r e s t of another insured w i t h o u t 
proper n o t i c e . I t a l s o found Dunn to be an agent of the 
defendant i n s u r e r s , and ordered Defendant J e f f e r s o n to 
r e c o g n i z e coverage of the i n t e r e s t of P l a i n t i f f Vina and to 
s e t t l e the l o s s . 
Couch on Insurance 2d, §67.118 provides: 
Where p r o p e r t y i s j o i n t l y owned and 
j o i n t l y insured, one owner cannot cancel 
the insurance without the consent of the 
other . 
Couch r e l i e s on the case of Jones v. Dubuque Fire and Marine 
I n s u r a n c e Company, 176 A. 2 08 ( P a . , 1934) f o r t h i s 
p r o p o s i t i o n . In that c a s e one of the owners of proper ty 
c a n c e l l e d insurance and s u b s t i t u t e d for i t another p o l i c y . 
The court ruled: 
Where proper ty i s owned j o i n t l y and so 
i n s u r e d , one owner cannot c a n c e l the 
p o l i c y of i n s u r a n c e and s u b s t i t u t e 
another t h e r e f o r w i t h o u t consent of the 
c o - i n s u r e d . To p r o v e e f f e c t i v e 
c a n c e l l a t i o n and s u b s t i t u t i o n of 
insurance p o l i c i e s , i t is necessary that 
the consent of a l l p a r t i e s insured be 
shown. 176A at 208. 
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That court also addressed an issue as to whether f 
the one party was ac t ing as an agent for the co- insured, and 
ruled as f o l l o w s : 
An a g e n t who s e c u r e s a p o l i c y of < 
insurance has no g e n e r a l a u t h o r i t y to 
cancel the po l i cy and s u b s t i t u t e another 
therefor u n l e s s s p e c i f i c a l l y a u t h o r i z e d 
to do so . 176A at 208 c i t i n g S c o t t v. 
Sun F i r e O f f i c e , 133 Pa. 332, 19 A. 350; 
Lancashire Insurance Company v. N i l l , 144 * 
Pa. 248, 6 A. 43; Provident L & T Company 
v. S.G. Insurance Company, 53 Pa. Super 
66 
The policy in question named both Vina and Pencille 
as insured parties and covered their separate and joint 
interests. 
With respect to the cancellation of an insurance 
policy Couch states at §22:16: 
!,The authority of an agent or broker 
speciallyemployed to procure insurance 
terminates with the procurement and 
delivery of the policy and in the absence 
of additional authorization, real or 
apparent, he has no authority to cancel 
the policy at a later date. One who 
authorizes another to procure insurance 
for himself does not thereby constitute 
such person his agent to receive notice 
of cancellation or for the purposes of 
agreeing to a proposed cancellation of 
the policy . . ." 
See also, National American Insurance Company v. Jamison 
Agency, Inc., 501 F.2d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir., 1974); Markel v. 
Travelers Insurance Company, 510 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir., 1975) 
(applying Kansas law); Fidelity & Casualty Company of New 
York v. Indiana Lumberman^ Mutual, 382 F.2d 839 (5th Cir., 
12 
1967) (applying Texas law); Dupek v. Union Insurance Company 
of America, 329 F.2d 548 (8th Cir., 1964) (applying Missouri 
law). 
In Dupek, supra, the Court a l s o noted that the 
burden of proof i s on the insurance company to prove the 
v a l i d c a n c e l l a t i o n of an insurance p o l i c y . 
There i s no presumpt ion that a broker 
e m p l o y e d t o p r o c u r e i n s u r a n c e has 
authori ty a f ter de l i very of the po l i cy to 
r e c e i v e a n o t i c e of c a n c e l l a t i o n . 329 
F.2d at 557 c i t i n g Applemen, Insurance 
Law & P r a c t i c e , Vol. 6, p. 739, §4187. 
The defendant insurance companies, therefore , could 
not b l i n d l y r e l y on Jon Dunn's a s s e r t i o n of p l a i n t i f f ' s 
c a n c e l l a t i o n . 
I l l 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING 
THE PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT 
PRIOR TO TRIAL TO INCLUDE A CLAIM AGAINST 
JON DUNN INDIVIDUALLY FOR NEGLIGENCE AND 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
At the close of trial on October 1, 1985, the Court 
considered the plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. In its 
motion, plaintiff attempted to add Third-Party Defendant Dunn 
as a party defendant. 
The Court ruled, in denying the motion, that Dunn 
was not an agent of Jefferson or of Transwestern and that the 
Motion to Amend was not timely filed. The Court went on to 
rule that the allegations raised in the Amended Complaint 
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against Dunn are substantially different from those raised 
against Dunn in the Third-Party Complaint of Defendant 
Jefferson and therefore, do not relate back to the Third-
Party Complaint filed by Jefferson, and were time barred by 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25 and 26, as amended, 1953. 
These statutes provide as follows: 
78-12-25. Within four years: 
(1) An action upon a contract, obligation 
or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing; also on an open 
account for g o o d s , w a r e s and 
merchandise, and for any article charged 
in a store account; also on an open 
account for work, labor or services 
rendered, or materials furnished; 
provided, that action in all of the 
foregoing cases may be commenced at any 
time within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is 
received. 
(2) An action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
78-12-26. Within three years: 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass 
upon or injury to real property; 
provided, that when waste or trespass is 
committed by means of underground works 
upon any mining claim, the cause of 
action shall not be deemed to have 
accrued until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting 
such waste or trespass. 
(2). An action for taking, detaining or 
injuring personal property, including 
actions for specific recovery thereof; 
provided, that in all cases where the 
subject of the action is a domestic 
animal usually included in the term 
"livestock," having upon it at the time 
of its loss a recorded mark or brand, if 
such animal had strayed or was stolen 
from the true owner without his fault, 
the cause shall not be deemed to have 
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accrued until the owner has actual 
knowledge of such facts as would put a. 
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the 
possession thereof by the defendant. 
(3) An action for relief on the ground 
of fraud or mistake; but the cause of 
action in such case shall not be deemed 
to have accrued until the discovery by 
the a g g r i e v e d p a r t y of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by 
the statutes of this state, other than 
for a penalty or forfeiture under the 
laws of this state, except w h e r e in 
special cases a different limitation is 
prescribed by the statutes of this state. 
The fire causing the damages complained of in 
plaintiff's C o m p l a i n t o c c u r r e d D e c e m b e r 31, 1979. 
Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendants Jefferson and 
Transwestern was filed February 19, 1982; and Jefferson's 
Third-Party Complaint against Dunn was filed on March 30, 
1982. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Plaintiff's Complaint was 
filed September 3, 1985, and was heard by the Court at the 
commencement of trial on October 1, 1985. 
The Trial Court supported its denial of plaintiff's 
m o t i o n by finding the allegations in the Third-Party 
Complaint to be substantially different than those raised 
in the proposed Amended Complaint. 
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c), 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint should relate back to the 
filing of the original action in 1982. 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides? 
Whenever a claim or defense asserted in 
the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the 
original pleading, the amendment relates 
back to the date of the original 
pleading. 
The Amended Complaint was based upon the grounds 
that in his deposition on November 8, 1984, Third-Party 
Defendant Dunn was negligent and breached a duty to plaintiff 
in writing the policy of insurance and failing to give 
plaintiff notice of cancellation of the policy by the co-
insured with knowledge that plaintiff had an insurable 
interest in the personal property. Third-Party Defendant 
Dunn had been a party to the action since its inception and 
had been involved in the discovery process all along. To not 
allow U.R.C.P. 15(c) to have appl icat ion by permitting the 
Amended Complaint foreclosed plaintiff from having his day in 
court with an essential party to the action. 
Generally Rule 15(c), U.R.C.P., will not 
apply to an amendment with substitutes or 
adds new parties for those brought before 
the court by the original pleadings --
whether plaintiff or defendant. This for 
the reason that such would amount tothe 
assertion of the new cause of action, and 
if such were allowed to relate back to 
the filing of the complaint, the purpose 
of a statute of limitation would be 
defeated. 
There is an exception to this rule. The 
exception operates where there is a 
relation back, as to both plaintiff and 
defendant, when new and old parties have 
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an identity of interest; so it can be 
assumed or proved the relation back is 
not prejudicial. The rationale 
underpinning this exception is none which 
obstructs a mechanical use of a statute 
of limitations; to prevent adjudication 
of a claim. Doxjg^ka%_ton Company v. 
Clark, 548 P.2d 902, f§06 TUtah, 19T6). 
In Doxey-layton, purchasers of real property sued 
the heirs of deceased sellers to reform a warranty deed, 
because of a scrivener's mistake. The defendants 
counterclaimed for an order requiring the purchasers to quit 
claim to them 75% of the mineral rights. The purchasers 
alleged that defendant's claim of mistake was barred by the 
statute of limitations, U.C.A. §78-12-26 (1953, as amended), 
and that a substitution of parties and filing of the 
counterclaim did not relate back to the filing of the 
complaint. 
After rejecting purchaser's claim as noted above, 
the Court went on to point out: 
Such is particularly valid where, as 
here, the real parties in interest were 
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, 
or were involved in them unofficially, 
from an early stage. 548 P.3d at 906. 
The trial court in the instant matter also found 
that the allegations alleged in the Amended Complaint are 
sufficiently different than those in the Third-Party claim. 
This Court has had occasion to deal with that issue before in 
the matter of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979), a 
medical malpractice action. The plaintiff there filed her 
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action on January 10, 1978 just a few days short of the end 
of the punning of the statute of limitations, alleging 
negligence. This Complaint was dismissed for failure to 
comply with the appropriate notice provisions and thereafter, 
on June 26, 1978, plaintiff filed a new action which was 
dismissed pursuant to the statute of limitations of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. This order of dismissal was 
. . .the defendant contends that the 
complaint filed January 10, 1978, is 
different from the complaint filed June 
26, 1978. The changes insofar as they 
add to the original complaint are 
basically additional specifications of 
alleged malpractice and arise out of the 
same basic operative facts set forth in 
the first complaint. The tol1ing statute 
requ ires only that the cla im or cla ims 
for refTef stated in the second act ion 
JLLliLJi 2.HJL £ j lil£ iJLJLIls JL£JLJL2I1 £JL 
occurrence on wh ich the claim or cla ims 
in the first act ion were founded. 6 01 
P.2d at 151. (Emphas is added). See also 
W i l M a m s v* Nelson, 145 P. 3 9 (Utah, 
19141. 
The Cal i forn ia Supreme Court noted that: 
. . . [ i t ] and o ther c o u r t s as w e l l as 
l e g i s l a t u r e s have l i b e r a l l y a p p l i e d 
t o l l i n g r u l e s on t h e i r f u n c t i o n a l 
e q u i v a l e n t s to s i t u a t i o n s in which the 
p l a i n t i f f has s a t i s f i e d the n o t i f i c a t i o n 
purpose of a l i m i t a t i o n s s t a t u t e . There 
i s , for example, the rule ' r e l a t i n g back1 
an amended compla in t to the date the 
o r i g i n a l compla in t was f i l e d prov ided 
that r e c o v e r y i s s t i l l sought upon the 
same g e n e r a l s e t of f a c t s that under lay 
the or ig ina l complaint. Elkins v. Derby, 
525 P.2d 81 ( C a l . , 1974). 
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Plaintiff Vina is effectively denied his "day in 
court" by allowing Third-Party Defendant Dunn to escape under 
the statute of limitations. 
OONCLUSION 
Plaintiff-Petitioner Vina prays that this Court 
find that Third-Party Defendant Dunn was, in fact, an agent 
of the insurers, that notice should have been provided the 
plaintiff before an effective cancellation of his insurance 
coverage could be accomplished, and that the "Relation-Back" 
doctrine should apply to allow the filing of his Amended 
Complaint. 
Submitted this day of December, 1986. 
QC&r* r\d Z* 
IETE .YOOQM 
'255 East 400 Soi/thV #100 
Salt Lake City, W a n 84111 
(801) 355-8998 
Attorney for Tony Vina 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
OtPnn/rn 
NOV ? 5 ;cs^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TONY VINA, ) 
Plaintiff, 
v. J 
JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
NEW YORK, a corporation, and ) 
TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY a 
corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
JEFFERSON INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
NEW YORK, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JON DUNN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
> FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil No. C-82-1323 
) Judge Scott Daniels 
The above-captioned case came on regularly for trial 
before the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding without a jury, on 
Tuesday, October 1, 1985, the plaintiff, Tony Vina, being 
represented by David E. Yocom, the defendant Jefferson Insurance 
Company of New York being represented by David W. Slagle, the 
defendant Transwestern General Agency, being represented by Paul 
N. Cotro-Manes, and the third-party defendant, John Dunn, being 
represented by H. Wayne Wadsworth. The Court, having heard the 
testimony of various witnesses and having considered exhibits which 
were a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , makes the fo l lowing F ind ings of Fac t 
and Conclus ions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. P l a i n t i f f , Tony V i n a , i s an i n d i v i d u a l who r e s i d e d 
in S a l t Lake County a t a l l t i m e s germane to t h i s a c t i o n . He was 
e n g a g e d in v a r i o u s b u s i n e s s v e n t u r e s , one of w h i c h was t h e 
o w n e r s h i p of e l e c t r o n i c games which were p l a c e d in p l a c e s of 
b u s i n e s s , such as t a v e r n s , beer ba r s and o the r e s t a b l i s h m e n t s for 
t h e p l a y and amusement of customers of those e s t a b l i s h m e n t s . Mr. 
Vina a l s o owned or l e a s e d v a r i o u s t a v e r n s and o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s 
in S a l t Lake County and , in t u r n , s u b l e a s e d t h o s e p r o p e r t i e s to 
o the r i n d i v i d u a l s for the purpose of o p e r a t i n g t a v e r n s . 
2 . D e f e n d a n t , J e f f e r s o n Insurance Company of New York, 
was a f o r e i g n i n s u r a n c e company a d m i t t e d to do b u s i n e s s in the 
S t a t e of Utah for t h e w r i t i n g , among o t h e r t y p e s of i n s u r a n c e , 
of f i r e and c a s u a l t y l o s s i n s u r a n c e . 
3 . Defendant , Transwes te rn General Agency, was a gene ra l 
i n s u r a n c e agency which w r o t e p o l i c i e s of insurance wi th a number 
of f o r e i g n insurance companies as t h e i r c o n t r a c t u a l gene ra l a g e n t . 
T r a n s w e s t e r n d i d no t s o l i c i t i n s u r a n c e b u s i n e s s from the p u b l i c 
b u t d i d so from i n d e p e n d e n t i n s u r a n c e a g e n t s and b r o k e r s . 
T r a n s w e s t e r n had an agency a g r e e m e n t w i t h J e f f e r s o n I n s u r a n c e 
Company of New York. 
4 . At a l l t i m e s germane to t h i s a c t i o n , T r a n s w e s t e r n 
G e n e r a l Agency was u n d e r a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t w i t h d e f e n d a n t 
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Jefferson Insurance Company of New York to act as its general agent 
within the State of Utah. Transwestern General Agency had 
authority to issue binders, policies of insurance, and cancellation 
notices of existing policies written by Jefferson. To facilitate 
this operation, Jefferson furnished Transwestern General Agency 
with a stock of policies and other forms. Transwestern General 
Agency would collect premiums from the producing agents and 
brokers, and would remit on a monthly basis the net premiums due 
to Jefferson after deducting the allowable costs and expenses and 
Transwestern General Agency commissions. 
5. Third-party defendant, Jon Dunn, was a licensed 
insurance agent and licensed insurance broker in the State of Utah 
who worked through an independent insurance agency known as the 
Walter Sondrup Insurance Agency. Jon Dunn had, from time to time, 
solicited and written other insurance policies for Tony Vina 
including insurance on his place of business located at 350 West 
500 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, and bars leased and subleased 
by Vina. Jon Dunn was not a licensed agent of either Jefferson 
Insurance of New York nor Transwestern General Agency. 
6. Beverly Pencille was at all times germane to this 
action a resident of Salt Lake County and was engaged in the 
operation of a business known as Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern on 
South State Street in South Salt Lake. Said business was a sole 
proprietorship. 
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7 . In t h e s p r i n g of 1979 Jon Dunn met w i t h B e v e r l y 
P e n c i l l e and Tony Vina a t V i n a ' s p l a c e of b u s i n e s s (350 West 500 
S o u t h ) a t V i n a 1 s r e q u e s t f o r t h e p u r p o s e of o b t a i n i n g f i r e 
i n s u r a n c e and l i a b i l i t y insurance for B e v i e - L e e ' s F r i e n d l y Tavern . 
At t h a t t i m e , B e v i e ~ L e e T s F r i e n d l y T a v e r n had been sub leased by 
Tony Vina to B e v e r l y P e n c i l l e . In a d d i t i o n , Tony Vina was the 
owner of v a r i o u s p i e c e s of equipment, i nc lud ing e l e c t r o n i c games, 
poo l t a b l e s , j u k e box , c i g a r e t t e mach ines , r e s t a u r a n t equipment , 
and bar equ ipment on t h e premises a t B e v i e - L e e ' s F r i e n d l y Tavern . 
A f t e r t h e m e e t i n g w i t h Vina and P e n c i l l e , Mr. Dunn ob t a ined the 
q u o t e s for a s p e c i a l m u l t i - p e r i l insurance p o l i c y for B e v i e - L e e ' s 
F r i e n d l y T a v e r n f r o m T r a n s w e s t e r n G e n e r a l A g e n c y . A f t e r 
commun ica t i ng t h e q u o t e d premium t o Bever ly P e n c i l l e and/or Tony 
V i n a , Mr. Dunn was a u t h o r i z e d t o o b t a i n t h e i n s u r a n c e cove rage . 
Mr. Dunn then ob ta ined pe rmiss ion from Transwes te rn General Agency 
t o i s s u e a b i n d e r of i n s u r a n c e which was t h e n p r e p a r e d by Mr. 
D u n n . S u b s e q u e n t l y , a p o l i c y of i n s u r a n c e was i s s u e d by 
T r a n s w e s t e r n G e n e r a l Agency w i t h t h e i n s u r i n g company b e i n g 
J e f f e r s o n I n s u r a n c e Company of New York, i n s u r i n g Bever ly P e n c i l l e 
and Tony Vina, d /b / a B e v i e - L e e ' s F r i e n d l y Tavern . 
8 . The in fo rma t ion supp l i ed by Jon Dunn to Transwes te rn 
G e n e r a l Agency c o n s i s t e d b a s i c a l l y of a q u e s t i o n n a i r e ( E x h i b i t 
No. ) , which was not s igned by Tony Vina or Bever ly P e n c i l l e 
or seen by Vina or P e n c i l l e , wherein Mr. Dunn informed Transwes te rn 
G e n e r a l Agency t h a t t h e e n t i t y t o be i n s u r e d was a p a r t n e r s h i p . 
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A policy was subsequently issued by Transwestern General Agency 
and, mistakenly, showed that Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern was a 
corporat ion. 
9. Shortly after the original policy was issued, Beverly 
Pencille, with the knowledge of Tony Vina, contacted Jon Dunn and 
requested that the limits of insurance coverage be reduced to 
$20,000 for damage to contents and $12,000 for loss of earnings 
or business interruption insurance. The change endorsement to 
that effect was issued by Transwetern General Agency and was signed 
for and approved by Beverly Pencille but not Tony Vina. 
10. In early November, 1979, Beverly Pencille and Jon 
Dunn met at Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern and Beverly Pencille 
informed Jon Dunn that she was either going to sell the business 
or was going to close her operation. She informed him that her 
lease expired on November 28, 1979, and that she wanted to cancel 
the insurance policy as of that date. On November 15, 1979, Jon 
Dunn met with Beverly Pencille at Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern and 
had her sign a "Request for Cancellation" form. Said document 
was then sent to Transwestern General Agency, and pursuant to that 
request, the policy of insurance was cancelled, effective as of 
November 28, 1979. Tony Vina did not sign the cancellation form 
nor did he have any knowledge that the insurance had been 
cancelled. 
11. Jon Dunn acknowledged that he knew Tony VinaTs games 
and equipment were still on the premises and that when the request 
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for cancellation was accepted by Transwestern General Agency and/or 
Jefferson Insurance Company, the games and equipment were left 
uninsured under the policy in question. 
12. Beverly Peneille did not close down her business 
and, on December 31, 1979, Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern was 
fire-bombed and the contents suffered extensive fire, smoke and 
water damage including Tony Vina's games and equipment. 
13. Within a few days following the fire, Tony Vina 
requested that Jon Dunn and/or Transwestern General Agency 
investigate and pay for his losses suffered in the fire. At that 
time he was informed that the policy had been cancelled and that 
Jefferson Insurance Company of New York would not honor his claim. 
14. The address listed on thfe application for insurance 
was 3554 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, which was the 
address of Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern. That when the limits of 
the insurance coverage were reduced, the change endorsement was 
signed for by only Beverly Peneille but Tony Vina approved, the 
reduction of coverage orally. Tony Vina did receive the original 
of the policy. That under the terms of a location contract 
(Exhibit No. ) entered into between Beverly Peneille and Tony 
Vina, Beverly Peneille and Tony Vina were to split all monies 
received from the gaming machines on a 50-50 basis and that Beverly 
Peneille was to receive 40 percent of all monies taken in by the 
cigarette machine. The juke box was leased to Peneille for a 
monthly fee and she retained all the proceeds. Further, that Tony 
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Vina did not share in the profits or losses of the operation of 
the tavern and the sublease agreement specifically provided that 
Beverly Pencille and Tony Vina were not partners or principal and 
agent. 
WHEREFORE, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. There was not an actual partnership between Beverly 
Pencille and Tony Vina. 
2. Jon Dunn was an insurance broker as that term is 
defined by Section 31-17-2(1), U.C.A., 1953, as amended, and as 
such was not acting as the agent of the defendants, Transwestern 
General Agency or Jefferson Insurance Company, but was the agent 
of Tony Vina and Beverly Pencille for. the purpose of placing the 
insurance coverage and cancelling same under the terms of the Utah 
Insurance Code. 
3. Transwestern General Agency and Jefferson Insurance 
Company of New York were entitled to rely on the representations 
of Jon Dunn who was acting as the agent of Beverly Pencille and 
Tony Vina. Accordingly, Transwestern General Agency and Jefferson 
Insurance Company of New York were entitled to believe that Beverly 
Pencille had the authority and power to cancel the policy of 
insurance without further signature or notice to Tony Vina. 
4. The policy of insurance was effectively cancelled 
November 28, 1979, and accordingly as of the date of the fire which 
was December 31, 1979, the policy of insurance issued by Jefferson 
i 
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Insurance Company of New York did not insure the personal property 
on the premises known as Bevie-Lee's Friendly Tavern nor did it 
provide loss of earnings or business interruption insurance. 
5. The Cross-Claim of Jefferson Insurance Company of 
New York against Transwestern General Agency, and the Third-Party 
Complaint of Jefferson Insurance Company of New York against Jon 
Dunn need not be decided because the plaintiff has no legal 
recourse against Jefferson Insurance Company of New York or 
Transwestern General Agency. 
6. The defendants, Jefferson Insurance Company of New 
York and Transwestern General Agency, are entitled to an 
involuntary dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 4 K b ) , Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and judgment of nNo Cause of Action" 
should be entered in their favor and against the plaint iff, and 
the Cross-Claim of Jefferson Insurance Company of New York and 
the Third-Party Complaint of Jefferson Insurance Company of New 
York should be dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Each party shall pay their own costs incurred in 
this action. 
Dated this day of October, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
SdWT btaltBLS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved as to form: 
PAUL N. OOTRO-MANES 
'^p^C 
\E WADSWC 
WAYNE WADSWORTH 
DAVID W. SLAGLE 
